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Accounting Information,Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital
In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about
a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We
build a model that is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model and
explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We
demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the
cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because
higher quality disclosures affect the firm’s assessed covariances with other
firms’ cash flows, which is nondiversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because
higher quality disclosures affect a firm’s real decisions, which likely changes
the firm’s ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these
cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this
effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an
increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost
of capital.
1. Introduction
The link between accounting information and the cost of capital of
firms is one of the most fundamental issues in accounting. Standard setters
∗The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; †Graduate School of Business, University
of Chicago.We thank Stan Baiman, John Cochrane, Gene Fama,Wayne Guay, Raffi Indjejikian,
Eugene Kandel, Christian Laux, D. J. Nanda, Haresh Sapra, Cathy Schrand, Phillip Stocken,
seminar participants at the Journal of Accounting Research conference, Ohio State University, and
the University of Pennsylvania, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on this
paper and previous drafts of work on this topic.
385
Copyright C, University of Chicago on behalf of the Institute of Professional Accounting, 2007
386 R. LAMBERT, C. LEUZ, AND R. E. VERRECCHIA
frequently refer to it. For example, Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), suggests that “high quality
accounting standards . . . reduce capital costs” (Levitt [1998, p. 81]). Similarly,
Neel Foster, a former member of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), claims that “More information always equates to less uncertainty,
and . . . people pay more for certainty. In the context of financial
information, the end result is that better disclosure results in a lower cost
of capital” (Foster [2003, p. 1]). While these claims have intuitive appeal,
there is surprisingly little theoretical work on the hypothesized link.